

# **An Analysis of the Factors of Australia's Influence on the Indonesian Policy Decision Making Process**

*A Comparison of the East Timor Independence and Executions of Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran Case Studies*



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## Contents

Abstract.....	5
Introduction .....	6
Literature Review.....	8
Foreign Policy Decision Making .....	9
Indonesian Foreign Policy Decisions .....	10
Independent Variables.....	<b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>
Research Design .....	13
Case Selection .....	13
Formation of the Hypothesis .....	13
Independent Variables to Test Hypothesis.....	14
Research Findings and Analysis .....	16
Public influence on decisions.....	18
Ministerial influence on decisions .....	20
Australian influence in wider international system .....	22
Testing the hypothesis.....	23
Conclusion.....	24
Bibliography .....	25

## **Abstract**

This paper examines what variables influence Indonesia's foreign policy decision making process the most. More specifically the research discusses the comparison of two case studies to see what variables have the most influence. The literature around this topic has analysed foreign policy decision making process from different levels of specificity. The research in this article will make reference to the broader contexts of foreign policy decision making whilst being grounded in the literature specific to Indonesian foreign policy. The East Timor independence 1998-1999 and the executions of Andrew Chan and Myurun Sukamaran cases in a comparative case study analysis. It will be found that the Rational Actor Model is insufficient to explain Indonesia's foreign policy decisions. It will also be found that the most influential variable analysed in this paper was the Australian ministerial influence variable.

## **Introduction**

The former Prime Minister of Australia Paul Keating once said that ‘no country was as important to Australia than Indonesia...’.<sup>1</sup> Whether or not his statement is true is inconsequential to the fact that Australia is deeply invested in the foreign policy decisions of Indonesia. The fact that Australia’s diplomatic mission in Indonesia is its largest of any Australian mission exemplifies the importance of the bilateral relationship to Australia. The geographical proximity of the two countries would also give credence to the fact Australia desires influence in Indonesia’s foreign policy decisions. This paper will aim to examine this relationship, that is to say, the influence Australia has on Indonesia’s foreign policy decisions.

Indonesia’s foreign policy decisions could be categorised most easily by the current President of the time and to a lesser extent the democratisation of Indonesia after two autocratic leaders. Despite the clear differences in Indonesia’s foreign policy decisions under the different presidents, there exists a principle that underwrites them all, to be free and active in foreign policy. This principle was conceived by Muhammad Hatta, the first Vice President of President Sukarno, in a speech entitled ‘Rowing Between Two Coral Reefs’ and was further expanded in his article ‘Indonesia’s Foreign Policy’.<sup>2</sup> We need only to use Indonesia’s attitude to foreign aid and foreign investment as a prism to view their decisions through. Often, Indonesia has found itself in a catch-22, in which to be wholly independent there needs to be high levels of development but to achieve this development Indonesia must accept foreign aid and investment that often come with strings attached. A perfect example of this paradoxical situation has been identified in Weinstein’s influential book. The United States’ government has requested that Indonesia recognise the Bao Dai government of Vietnam. Indeed, the Indonesian government believed that this recognition for the Bao Dai government was required before it was to receive further aid.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, another example

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<sup>1</sup> Bilveer Singh, *Defense Relations between Australia and Indonesia in the post-Cold War Era*, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2002), 89.

<sup>2</sup> Mohammad Hatta, ‘Indonesia’s Foreign Policy’, *Foreign Affairs*, 31 (1953), 441-52.

<sup>3</sup> Franklin B. Weinstein, *Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Dilemma of Dependence: From Sukarno to Suharto*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), 210.

would be Indonesia's reluctance and final decision not to sell rubber to the Soviet Union at an inflated price because of a fear in losing American aid credits.<sup>4</sup> These strings that were attached to foreign aid and investment eventually lead to Sukarno's rhetoric to change on the matter of aid. Initially being supportive of aid he later found himself in, what he argued, was a system of economic colonialism.<sup>5</sup> Despite this change in rhetoric Sukarno still realised the power of economic aid in building the Indonesian economy and consequently remained a factor in Indonesian foreign policy decisions.<sup>6</sup> The foreign policy decisions of Sukarno largely existed within the paradigm of Muhammad Hatta's vision for Indonesian politics. That is primarily, anti-colonialism and independence. The argument may be made that the decisions to invade West Irian and to oppose the creation of a Malay state were examples of this paradigm existing.

In rather broad terms one may say that Sukarno's foreign policy began with enthusiasm to build Indonesia through foreign aid but eventually Sukarno found this to be contrary to the principles of anti-colonialism and independence. Suharto's foreign policy decisions signalled a change back to the original idea of building Indonesia internally so that it may act free and independent.<sup>7</sup> A perfect contrast in the decisions of Sukarno and Suharto may be found in the confrontation with the newly formed Malaysia. Sukarno was quoted in Weinstein's book saying that 'If some nation says to us, you can have aid, but you have to end the confrontation, then I say "go to hell with your aid"'.<sup>8</sup> This comment can be contrasted with Suharto's decision to end the confrontation and build friendlier relations with the west in order to receive aid and consequently internally develop Indonesia. This example is perfect to demonstrate the shift in foreign policy under Suharto.<sup>9</sup> It is important to note that despite key differences in Suharto and Sukarno's foreign policies that there remains the underlying principles formed by Muhammad Hatta.

Under Suharto Indonesia celebrated the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Asia-Africa Conference in 1985, showing that Indonesia was ready to be active on the global stage again after strong economic development. He followed this with the decision to become the Non-Aligned Movement's chairmanship in order to restore Indonesia's place as a leader in the

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid 212-25.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Rizal Sukma, 'The Evolution of Indonesia's Foreign Policy: An Indonesian View', *Asian Survey*, 35(3) (1995), 311.

<sup>8</sup> Weinstein, *Dilemma of Dependence*, 219.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, 225-41.

third world.<sup>10</sup> Rizal Sukma's article also identifies two other decisions that demonstrate change and a new found confidence in Indonesian foreign policy. The first to open relations with the Chinese in 1990 despite initial fears that they would meddle in Indonesian matters. The second was to dissolve an important source of foreign aid, the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), as a response to its criticism on Indonesia's human rights abuses in East Timor. Indonesia decided to replace this with a group led by the World Bank.<sup>11</sup>

The democratisation period following the Sukarno and Suharto periods is where this paper will focus its examination of Indonesian foreign policy decisions. President Habibie was the first President Suharto. His period of rule was short but included one of the most significant decisions in Indonesian foreign policy history, that is to allow East Timor a vote on independence. This will be the first case study used by this paper. The second case study that will be analysed is the executions of Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukamaran in 2015. To analyse the independent variables that influenced these decisions would require more extensive research. This paper will instead analyse the Australian variables that influenced these decisions and ask the question 'What factors led to Australia achieving its desired outcome in the East Timorese independence decision but not in the decision to execute Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukamaran?'. While this paper may not be able to conclusively answer what factors led to the decisions it will be able to provide the Australian context that may benefit further research on the issue.

### **Literature Review**

The dependent variable of this paper is Indonesian foreign policy decisions, as such this section will focus on that variable at different levels, sectioned into groups. The first group will be the broadest group; it will review the literature of foreign policy decision making in general. Because of limitations in space the first group will be the most general in its review. The second group that will be reviewed looks at the literature that concerns itself with the broader context in which Indonesian policy decisions are made. Finally, the third group will review literature specific to Presidents Joko Widodo and Habibie.

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<sup>10</sup> Sukma, *Evolution of Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 312-4.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*

### Foreign Policy Decision Making

Graham T. Allison has written extensively and influentially on conceptual models in foreign policy analysis. His book *Essence of Decision* which was partly condensed into his paper in *The American Political Science Review* analyses three conceptual models.<sup>12</sup> The first model is the Rational Actor Model. Allison defines the Rational Actor Model by examining the paradigm in which it exists. Rational Actor Model has policy exist as a national choice. Indeed, Allison argues that the unit of analysis in the Rational Actor Model is the state. This state identifies a problem and then the options with inherent consequences. The state maximises its decision by choosing the option with the most favourable consequences towards their goals.<sup>13</sup> The second model, Organisational Process Model, was defined as the primary unit of analysis being the domestic organisations within a state. Policy was a result of a problem being identified and then different parts of said problem being assigned to organisations that each have their own standard operating procedure. Allison argues that the state will choose whatever solution is first conceived by an organisation.<sup>14</sup> The third model, Bureaucratic Politics Model, identifies individual actors as the unit of analysis. He argues that policy is an outcome of political gamesmanship. Allison argues, simplistically, that Rational Actor Model fails to recognise the constraints placed on it by organisational constraints and bureaucratic influences.<sup>15</sup> This argument is concurred with by Martin Hollis and Steve Smith in their article. They add that the Rational Actor Model ignores how preferences are formed and that the Bureaucratic Politics Model ignores the fact that bureaucracies often provide and output that is rational.<sup>16</sup>

There is wide agreement with these two works, in that Rational Actor Model is incapable of being a proper tool for foreign policy analysis. Both sets of work use different case studies to prove their theses, Allison used the Cuban Missile Crisis and Hollis and Smith use the embassy hostage situation in Iran following the fall of the Shah. Despite this they still both came to the conclusion that Rational Actor Model fails to acknowledge the possible applications of the Bureaucratic Politics Model and the Organisational Process Model.

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<sup>12</sup> Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, (Boston: Little Brown 1971).

<sup>13</sup> Graham T. Allison, 'Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis', *The American Political Science Review*, 63(3), 1968, 691-99.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, 699-707.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid*, 707-18.

<sup>16</sup> Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, 'Roles and Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making', *British Journal of Political Science*, 16(3) 1986, 269-286.

### Indonesian Foreign Policy Decisions

Indonesia's foreign policy has been explored by many academics from many angles. The base of the literature comes from Muhammad Hatta in his essays *Indonesian Foreign Policy* and *Indonesia Between the Power Blocs* he lays the base in which most literature will reference in their work.<sup>17</sup> Hatta identifies that an Indonesia within the context of the Cold War must not take sides between America or the Soviet Union nor should it form a new bloc which aims to balance the two superpowers.<sup>18</sup> He specifies that Indonesia would not be neutral as that is a legal definition within international law but that instead Indonesia is committed to international solidarity.<sup>19</sup> Hatta argues that Indonesia should be active within the international system through organisations such as the United Nations in order to help achieve international solidarity.<sup>20</sup> To do this Hatta insists that Indonesia must be independent. From this he forms the principle of 'independent and active'. Hatta's work is not peer reviewed but has non-the-less been accepted as the literature for the basis of Indonesian foreign policy.

Several articles and books within this topic of Indonesian foreign policy are broad overviews of Indonesian foreign policy. Weinstein's influential book surveys the foreign policies of Sukarno and Suharto in the context of the independent principle put forward by Hatta and the dilemma of achieving this principle. Rizal Sukma's article is likewise a broad overview which looks at the evolution of Indonesian foreign policy from Sukarno to Suharto. While similar points are made in both works what differs is the weight given to the independent and active principle in analysing Indonesia's foreign policy. Weinstein's article, while not a broad study, neatly argues that foreign policy analysis on developing states often ignores the unique economic and political factors that are found within developing states, instead using long term factors in analyses.<sup>21</sup> Weinstein does not dismiss these long term factors but instead weighs them less in analysis. Sukma is quite contrary to Weinstein's argument and places heavy emphasis on long standing principles in their analysis. Primary to Sukma's analysis is the independent and active principle. Sukma argued that '... the extent to which its [Indonesia's] foreign policy was governed by a strong commitment to the the two basic principles of *anti-kolonialisme* (anticolonialism) and presumably an unchanging

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<sup>17</sup> Mohammad Hatta, 'Indonesia Between the Power Blocs', *Foreign Policy*, 36, 1958, 480-90.

<sup>18</sup> Hatta, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy*, 441-3.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Franklin B. Weinstein, 'The uses of Foreign Policy in Indonesia: An approach to the analysis of Foreign Policy in the Less Developed Countries', *World Politics*, 24(3), 1972, `

conceptual framework of *politik luar negeri bebas-aktif* (independent and active foreign policy) is striking.<sup>22</sup> Weinstein argued that Indonesia faced a ‘dilemma of dependence’ in that to become properly independent Indonesia needed to develop more but to do so would require foreign aid and investment which would come with strings attached. He demonstrates that initially Sukarno was in favour of foreign aid as it would build Indonesia internally. Despite this Weinstein argued that Sukarno found that there were a lot of strings attached to foreign aid. Weinstein quoted Sukarno extensively that showed rhetoric had changed against foreign aid although pointing out that it was still accepted by Sukarno.<sup>23</sup> This change in rhetoric is also identified by Sukma.

Kai He’s article examines four specific cases in the post-Suharto period and analyses them by applying the ‘international pressure-political legitimacy’ model. He argues that the ‘international pressure-political legitimacy’ model adequately explains the four cases chosen in his study and subsequently other cases in the period. He states that the model allows for more option in policy decisions when there is a high level of political legitimacy and a low level of international pressure but conversely there is much more limited option when there is low political legitimacy but high level of international pressure. He uses President Megawati’s policy in Aceh in fighting the separatists as an example of there being a low level of international pressure and a high level of political legitimacy. Then as an example of high level of international pressure but low level of political legitimacy He uses the East Timor independence decisions under President Habibie.<sup>24</sup> This study has been somewhat contrary to other studies reviewed because of the lack of emphasis placed on the underwriting principles of Indonesian foreign policy found in most other studies.

### **Indonesian Foreign Policy Decisions Under Presidents Habibie and Joko Widodo**

Aaron L. Connelly’s article argues that President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) strength in foreign policy will not be replicated by President Joko Widodo. Instead Joko Widodo will be domestically focused policy wise.<sup>25</sup> Connelly’s argument is similar to the article he wrote in the Lowly Institute. The Lowly article argues that Joko Widodo will delegate the foreign policy to his advisers but that they will all not often agree with each

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<sup>22</sup> Rizal Sukma, *Evolution of Indonesian Foreign Policy*, 306.

<sup>23</sup> Franklin B. Weinstein, *Dilemma of Dependence*, 206-25.

<sup>24</sup> Kei He, ‘Indonesia’s Foreign Policy after Soeharto: International Pressure, Democratisation, and Policy Change’, *International Relations of the Asia Pacific*, 47-52.

<sup>25</sup> Aaron L. Connelly, ‘Sovereignty and the Sea: President Joko Widodo’s Foreign Policy Challenges’, *Contemporary South East Asia*, 37(1), 2015, 1-4.

other.<sup>26</sup> While the Lowly article is not peer reviewed Connelly's other article is and they both largely reach the same conclusions. Connelly argues that Joko's focus on domestic policies will have unwanted implications in the foreign policy area for Indonesia. He identifies Joko's desire to strengthen maritime policy and Indonesia's sovereignty. Connelly states that these policy decisions will have unwanted implications because of Indonesia's maritime borders being shared with others as well as sovereignty issues having wider implications. Whereas this is the focus of Connelly in his *Sovereignty and the Sea* article, his Lowly article instead focuses on the structural implications of the Joko presidency. Namely that his advisers will often be at odds and that Joko neither has the ability nor will to intervene and make strong policy decisions in the realm of foreign policy.

The article *Between Aspirations and Reality* argues that Indonesia's foreign policy will be an extension of SBY's presidency under Joko. This argument was largely based on the underlying principles found in Indonesian foreign policy. The article argued that 'Most analysts agree that Jokowi is unlikely to depart from Yudhoyono's basic foreign policy vision, which has sought to balance raising Indonesia's leadership profile in regional and international fora with ensuring that its commitments do not undermine its prized autonomy or overstretch its limited capabilities.' This argument was made by citing the visi-misi (vision and mission) of President Joko.<sup>27</sup> However, the Lowly Institute and Connelly identify that the foreign policy parts of the visi-misi were formed partly by Joko's advisers instead of his strong direction instead of SBY's strong foreign policy tendencies. The Lowly Institute writes 'As Jokowi learns more about foreign affairs through the practice of it, he may come to his own views on the subject. But until he does, he will rely upon a team of advisers for foreign policy advice.' It may not be the case that *Between Aspirations and Reality* is contrary to Lowly and Connelly but that Lowly and Connelly offer a more nuanced analysis of Joko's foreign policy.

Kei He's article looks at several cases in the post-Suharto period, in regards to Habibie he examines the cases of East Timor and Indonesia's silence in response to China's criticism of the anti-Chinese May Riots in 1998.<sup>28</sup> His article is from the Indonesian

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<sup>26</sup> Aaron L. Connolly, 'Indonesian Foreign Policy Under President Jokowi', *The Lowly Institute*, 2014, < [http://www.lowlyinstitute.org/files/indonesian-foreign-policy-under-president-jokowi\\_0.pdf](http://www.lowlyinstitute.org/files/indonesian-foreign-policy-under-president-jokowi_0.pdf) > [Accessed: 23 April 2016].

<sup>27</sup> Prashanth Parameswaran, 'Between Aspiration and Reality: Indonesian Foreign Policy After the 2014 Elections', *The Washington Quarterly*, 37(3), 2014, 153-165.

<sup>28</sup> Kei He, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy after Soeharto*, 55-62.

perspective and argues that Habibie only gave independence to East Timor because it was under a lot of international pressure to do so while Habibie only enjoyed a small amount of political legitimacy. Iain Henry's article uses a different methodology in his article, ignoring a theoretical framework. His article also differs from He's because of the fact that it analyses the Australian perspective on the East Timor crisis. We can see throughout the Henry article that Australia was worried about the legitimacy of Habibie. This would have Henry's article and He's be in agreement.

## **Research Design**

### **Case Selection**

This paper will ask the question 'What Australian variables influence Indonesia's foreign policy decision making process?' In order to help answer this question this paper will make use of the East Timor independence decision and the decision to execute Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukamaran case studies to help answer this question. The interconnectedness of Indonesia and Australia would mean that there are many case studies that would be able to aid us in answering these questions. However, there are few other case studies that have such high stakes for Australia. Perhaps the Confrontation with Malaysia would be a comparable case study but this was largely lead by the British and Malaysians with Australia's support as a member of the Commonwealth. The case studies chosen involved Australia heavily and indeed there are many more variables unique to Australia that influenced or had effect on Indonesia's decision. The decision to review two cases instead of one is for the purpose of testing the paper's hypothesis over two case studies. It is not the intention of this paper to suggest that the case studies are related in anyway other than the fact that they fit the dependent variable of Indonesian foreign policy decisions. The case studies were also chosen because of the difference in the desired outcome for Australia. The executions were contrary to Australia's foreign policy goals but the East Timor independence vote was the desired outcome for Australia. As the research question states the paper will analyse the different independent variables that influence the dependent variable and try to examine why Australia achieved the desired outcome in one instance but did not in the other instance.

### **Formation of the Hypothesis**

The hypothesis this paper will operate on is that Australia alone is not able influence Indonesia's foreign policy decisions if it is contrary to a favourable outcome for Indonesia.

This hypothesis was formed primarily because of the literature on the Rational Actor Model would argue that Indonesia would choose the alternative with the best consequences. The work that will be used to help define the Rational Actor Model will be Allison's work on conceptual models.<sup>29</sup> While he did have criticism of the Rational Actor Model he did properly outline its use as a tool of analysis. Similarly, in the vein of Allison's work, Hollis and Smith criticise the Rational Actor Model but find a way of reconciling in it by making it more suitable for analysis.<sup>30</sup> This work was all influential in the formation of this hypothesis. All that follows is rather subservient to their work and works within their framework. It would follow that Australia's influence in minimal in this as the variables that influence decisions would largely be from sources other than Australia. Domestic factors for example play a large role in decisions that Australia has little to no influence on. As well as the research done on Rational Actor Model the formation of this hypothesis is also grounded in the literature Indonesia's underwriting foreign policy principles. That is to say Indonesia will aim to be independent and active in its foreign policy and as such would try as much as possible to be independent from Australian influence. The literature of the specific cases also gives credence to this hypothesis. Quite clearly they identify many factors that have bearing on the two cases that are rather dismissive of Australian factors as a primary reason. To properly test this hypothesis, it would be necessary to examine other variables that influence the case studies, although that is largely beyond the scope of this paper some room will be allowed for that discussion. It is important to note that this hypothesis is intended to be able to be applied and tested to all Indonesian decisions and that the formation of this particular hypothesis in regards to the chosen case studies is merely one of many possible applications.

### **Independent Variables to Test Hypothesis**

As stated previously this case study's dependent variable is Indonesian foreign policy decisions. Importantly we must define foreign policy to first establish whether or not the cases involved are in fact foreign policies. Foreign policy, for the purposes of this paper, is a policy that is formed in a government's dealings with another state or states to maximise their national interest. While it may be argued that the executions of Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukmaran was a domestic policy, and indeed it was, it was also a foreign policy because of the implications it had internationally and primarily with Australia. This paper argues this on the basis that it would be likely that Indonesia knew that Australia would protest in several

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<sup>29</sup> Graham T. Allison, *Conceptual Model*, 269-86.

<sup>30</sup> Martin Smith, *Reasons in Foreign Policy Decision Making*, 689-718.

ways against the executions. In the case of the East Timor independence decision it is clearly a foreign policy decision as it was a decision that had international implications for Indonesia in its relationship with other states and organisations. It follows that while they may be interpreted as domestic policies they are considered, for the purposes of this paper to be foreign policies.

This study will compare the two case studies by examining the Australian independent variables on the dependent variable. The variables that will be considered follow: 1) Australian public influence on Indonesian decisions 2) Australian ministerial influence on Indonesian decisions 3) Australian influence in the wider international system to achieve desired outcomes in Indonesia.

Public influence will be defined by this paper as influence coming from Australian sources other than the Australian government. is hard to quantify; however, this paper will look at the different influences the Australian public has had on the case studies in several ways. Firstly, the paper will examine the influence the Australian public has on Australia's preferences. Indeed, it may be the case that the 'desired outcome' for Australia is only defined by the government when public opinion has influenced it that way. Indicating that the Australian public influence the other variables in which Australia has tried to influence Indonesian decisions. This paper will attempt to quantify this variable by looking at existing statistics on the amount of Australian tourism to Bali as well as public opinion polls on the different case studies. While this quantification will be far from conclusive proof as to whether or not the Australian public had direct influence in the cases, it may be enough to suggest that it informs the other variables.

The ministerial influence variable is hard to define and set apart from the third and fourth variables as they would be influenced and driven by the ministerial leaders of Australia. This variable will focus on specific comments and direct ministerial level communications between the two countries. The ministerial variable is even harder to quantify, instead of quantifying the analysis will primarily be qualitative of the different actions and decisions made at the ministerial level that would influence Indonesian decision making. This will be done through a review of both the literature and media, following this there will be an analysis of the information collected.

Australia's influence in the international system will again be quantitative in nature. This variable is defined as Australia's endeavours to bring influence on Indonesian foreign policy decisions through international forums. In other words, it will examine the Australian influences that do not come from a bilateral perspective. This variable will be analysed again by a collection of qualitative data that will help inform an analysis about this variable. This variable may be hard to discern whether or not Australia was the driving force behind the influence. We can however examine the public comments made by Australia to international organisations and other states.

These variables will be analysed and discussed within the prism of the respective cases. Following the discussion of each variable there will be a comparison of each variable in relation to the cases in order to examine the question 'What Australian variables influence Indonesia's foreign policy decision making process?'

### **Research Findings and Analysis**

In order to properly understand how the independent variables, influence the dependent variable we must examine and give a proper background for the cases first. Following this introduction to the cases this section will then individually look at all the variables chosen for analysis. Within each subsection there will be a layout of the evidence or informational that will be used to inform the analysis for both cases. There will then be an analysis of the evidence and a comparison will aim to be made between both cases.

The executions of Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukamaran was a long drawn out process over ten years which began with the arrests of nine Australians and culminated in the executions of Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukamaran while the others were given life sentences. They were arrested for drug crimes, a highly sensitive issue in Indonesia, the court found that they were smuggling heroin into Australia at the value of \$3.1 million US Dollars.<sup>31</sup> This amount is an executable offense in Indonesia. The Bali Nine, as dubbed by Australian media, was covered extensively by the media. While covered most extensively in the Australian media it was also covered by other media including Indonesia's. Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukamaran were believed to be the ringleaders for the criminal group. Their sentence reflects this; they were sentenced to death whilst the other members were sentenced

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<sup>31</sup> John Aglionby, 'Australian Drug Mules Jailed for Life', *The Guardian*, 14 Feb 2006 < <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/14/australia.indonesia> > [Accessed 16 Mar 2016]

to life imprisonment with one person receiving twenty years.<sup>32</sup> The group was arrested on 17 April 2005. Andrew Chan was arrested after boarding a plane back to Australia with no drugs found on him. While Myuran Sukamaran was arrested at his hotel found with heroin and the equipment needed to smuggle drugs. Following their arrest there was ten years of trials and many appeals. Initially they were both sentenced to death by the Denpasar District Court which was upheld by both the Bali High Court and the Supreme Court of Indonesia on appeals. Finally, they both requested clemency from President Joko Widodo which was refused.<sup>33</sup> Public opinions on the executions were conflicting in Australia but what is clear is the Australian efforts to try reduce the sentences of the two men. These will be outlined in the subsequent sections.

The East Timor independence takes place within the context of the reformation or period directly following the fall of the autocrat, Suharto. East Timor gained independence from Portugal in 1975, however, what followed was the country being annexed by Suharto as he believed it would give incentive for other separatist regions in Indonesia to declare independence. This annexation was supported by both America and Australia.<sup>34</sup> The East Timor situation was long supported by Australia as a bipartisan issue. The long standing sentiment was that, despite human rights abuses by Indonesia in East Timor, Jakarta was the more important relationship for Australia to pursue and indeed the stability of the Suharto regime.<sup>35</sup> The fall of the Suharto saw President Habibie came to power. Habibie was not a hardliner on the issue of East Timorese independence like Suharto was, indeed, he suggested, whilst Vice-President, that East Timor should receive special autonomy status.<sup>36</sup> Now that Habibie had become the third President of Indonesia he first suggested that East Timor should be given special autonomy, just as he suggested whilst Vice-President. This however was not considered to be enough for Portugal who demanded full independence for East Timor. Habibie acquiesced to international demands and held a referendum on autonomy, if the referendum were to fail, and it did, then East Timor were to become independent.<sup>37</sup> It is

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<sup>32</sup> Claire Phipps, 'Who Were the Eight People Executed by Indonesia?' *The Guardian*, 28 Apr 2015 < <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/29/bali-nine-who-are-the-nine-people-being-executed-by-indonesia> > [Accessed 16 Apr 2016].

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Kei He, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy After Soeharto*, 56. And Iain Henry, 'Unintended Consequences: an examination of Australia's "Historic Policy Shift" on East Timor', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 68(1), 2014, 54.

<sup>35</sup> Iain Henry, *Australia's "Historic Policy Shift" on East Timor*, 54.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 56.

<sup>37</sup> Kei He, *Indonesia's Foreign Policy After Soeharto*, 57

important to note with the East Timor case, that the fact Australia's policy on Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor was supportive of Jakarta it does not mean that Australia did not want East Timorese independence initially. It rather means that the alternative for supporting Jakarta over the issue meant that the consequences for supporting Jakarta had better outcomes for Australia than the independence of East Timor. This makes sense when you consider Suharto's hardliner position on the East Timor question. However, regime change gave way to a change in Australian policy.

### **Public influence on decisions**

Public opinion has often been a variable on foreign policy decisions. Most of the analysis on public opinion's influence of foreign policy decisions refers to the domestic factors rather than another country's public opinion having influence on a different country's decision making process. In the execution case the argument may be made that the only reason that the Australian government was so opposed to the executions was that domestic public opinion swayed them. This certainly would be consistent with the Bureaucratic Politics Model that was properly defined by Allison's work. It fits the model as it would suggest that foreign policy decisions are a result of political gamesmanship, and that the unit of analysis in this model is the individual. As such the individual would be very interested in maintaining power. Matt McDonalds work addresses this argument. He argues that Tony Abbott's foreign policy, and by extension Australia's, was informed largely by public opinion.<sup>38</sup> If this is the case, then the argument can be made that most of Australia's opposition within the other variables was only occurring because of the strong public opinion backing the issue. However, there is an argument to be made that public opinion was not in favour of Australia's efforts to stop the executions. A poll conducted by Roy Morgan Research over the period of 23 January to 27 January 2015 suggests that 52% percent of Australians polled thought that Australians convicted of drug trafficking in countries with the death penalty and are sentenced to death they should be executed. Additionally, 62% of people thought that the government should not do more to stop the executions of the two men.<sup>39</sup> Prime Minister Tony Abbott is also a member of the Liberal party, the polling breaks down voting preferences and compares it to how people answered on the poll. 63% of Liberal voters polled said they supported the fact that if Australians are convicted of drug crimes in

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<sup>38</sup> Matt McDonald, 'Australian Foreign Policy under the Abbott Government: Foreign Policy as Domestic Politics?', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 69(6), 2015, 651-669.

<sup>39</sup> 'Australians Think Andrew Chan & Myuran Sukumaran Should be Executed', *Roy Morgan Research*, 27 Jan. 2015, < <http://www.roymorgan.com/findings/6044-executions-andrew-chan-myuran-sukumaran-january-2015-201501270609> > [Accessed 18 Feb. 2016].

countries where there is the death penalty, and that penalty is imposed then they should be executed.<sup>40</sup> If Tony Abbott's foreign policy was informed by public opinion, then why is that a majority of Liberal voters polled do not support the endeavours of the government. These statistics show that public opinion may not necessarily have been for the government's efforts in influencing the Indonesian decision. These statistics are very simplistic and will not allow for a conclusive statement to say whether or not the public influenced the Australian government's efforts. The study does not put weight into the strength of people's opinions when they were polled. For example, the people that believe Australia should do more to stop the executions may be prepared to hold demonstrations in the street whilst the people that believe Australia should not do more are more or less apathetic to the situation. For this reason, this paper finds the question of public opinion inconclusive. While it would be naïve to say that the Australian public had no influence on the other variables, indeed it may be the case that the strength of the Australian rhetoric was because of the strong public opinion on the issue, it would be difficult to comprehensively say what influenced the Australian efforts the most.

This study could not find similar statistics on the East Timor independence case but Michael Smith identifies that public opinion became very strong on the issue after the violence that followed the independence vote.<sup>41</sup> This in turn influenced the Australian decision to lead a peacekeeping mission into East Timor. This however is beyond the scope of this study. What is mentioned is that there was protest movements that included the Australian Catholic Church, unions and the Australian East Timorese population during the Indonesian occupation of East Timor.<sup>42</sup> This clearly had not influence on Australia's decision to try to influence Indonesia's policy, as this would have unwanted consequences within the Jakarta-Canberra relationship.

This section has not exhausted the topic of public influence on the Indonesian decision making process, rather it has focused primarily on the public opinion influencing the decisions. As such it would be wrong to make a definitive statement on the influence the Australian public has on the Indonesian foreign policy decision making process. It would, however, be fair to say that the Australian public has no influence, at least directly, on the Indonesian decision making process. It we ask the research question again 'What Australian

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Michael Smith and Moreen Dee, *Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence*, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 21-2

<sup>42</sup> Iain Henry, *Australia's 'Historic Policy Shift' on East Timor*, 53.

variables influence Indonesia's foreign policy decision making process?' and apply it to this variable we can see that public opinion or indeed influence is not a variable that significantly influences Indonesia's decision making. While we have been unable to quantify this conclusion we can qualify it based on the fact that public opinion seems to have had no bearing on the desired outcomes for Australia.

### **Ministerial influence on decisions**

The ministerial influence is likely the variable was the most influence is found to exist. While the ministerial variable may in fact influence the 'Australian influence in the international system' variable it should be considered separate. The reason it should be considered separate for the purposes of the analysis is that the influence it provides is indirect. While the ministerial variable, for the purposes of this paper, should be considered to have a direct influence over the decision.

The executions had quite a bit of ministerial involvement on behalf of Australia. It would be almost impossible to quantify this influence but we can easily survey the influence. On the eve of the executions many ministers made comments to their counterparts and pleas within the Australian parliament. The Guardian writes that Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop warned, through phone calls and letters, that if the executions went forward there would be consequences in terms of Australian tourism to Bali and Indonesia. This was dismissed by the Indonesian foreign minister saying that 'I have told Julie that this is not against a country, this is not against nationals of a certain country, but this is against a crime, against an extraordinary crime.'<sup>43</sup> This is just an example of many bilateral conversations and pleas made by the Australian ministerial team. Indeed, this was not the only plea Julie Bishop as she also argued on Australian national radio that Indonesia's stance on the death penalty was hypocritical based on the Indonesian government's tendency to protest at their own citizens receiving the death penalty abroad. The Indonesian Foreign ministry contested this, saying that they only offer support needed to ensure a fair trial for their citizens but do not contest the other states law itself.<sup>44</sup> These exchanges were indicative of the media's coverage at the

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<sup>43</sup> Bridie Jabour, 'Julie Bishop Says Executing Bali Nine Pair Might Hurt Australian Tourism to Indonesia', *The Guardian*, 12 Feb 2015, < <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/13/chan-and-sukumaran-way-cleared-for-transfer-from-bali-jail-ahead-of-execution> > [Accessed 2 Mar 2016].

<sup>44</sup> Ben Doherty and Kate Lamb, 'Bali Nine: Indonesia Denies Bishop's Claim of Death Penalty Double Standards', *The Guardian*, 16 Feb 2015, < <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/17/bali-nine-indonesia-denies-bishops-claim-of-death-penalty-double-standards> > [Accessed 28 Apr 2016].

time, in that they were reporting that Australians at the ministerial level were directly contacting counterparts and contacts in Indonesia to try to stop the executions. The Prime Minister himself was also involved in these exchanges arguing, rather undiplomatically, ‘Let’s not forget that a few years ago when Indonesia was struck by the Indian Ocean tsunami Australia sent a billion dollars’ worth of assistance... I would say to the Indonesian people and the Indonesian government: we in Australia are always there to help you and we hope that you might reciprocate in this way at this time.’<sup>45</sup> He also argued that there would be consequences for Indonesia if they decided to go ahead with the executions. Unsurprisingly his arguments were not accepted that well with the Indonesian Foreign Ministry saying ‘Threats are not part of diplomatic language and from what I know, no one responds well to threats.’<sup>46</sup> It is clear that the comments made and attempts to prevent the executions were either not accepted or even received well but the Indonesian decision makers.

When we look at the ministerial variable in the East Timor case we need only look at the letter from Prime Minister John Howard to President Habibie. Reportedly, Habibie was angry at the change in Australia’s policy as Australia was one of Indonesia’s supporters in its sovereignty over East Timor. Kei He suggests that the letter from John Howard was a trigger for the announcement of a referendum.<sup>47</sup> Henry also identifies Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer’s visit to Indonesia at the time where progress was made in discussions on the East Timor issue of independence. Habibie reportedly said ‘it was John Howard who made me make the decision so quick.’<sup>48</sup> This would be the largest example of ministerial influence in the Indonesian decision making process and it clearly had the desired effect. Much of the influence the ministerial variable had could have come from the way in which Australia approached Indonesia. Australia approached Indonesia as a friend in effect saying that the international system would view Indonesia more kindly if it did give Indonesia autonomy and later independence. In addition to this offering to help survey the East Timorese population to find out if they were perceptive to autonomy or not.

The question is, why did the ministerial influence work in the case of East Timor but not in the case of the Bali 9. This would be difficult to answer conclusively as there are

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<sup>45</sup> Daniel Hurst, ‘Tony Abbott: Indonesia Should Reciprocate Tsunami Aid by Sparing Bali Nine Pair’, *The Guardian*, 18 Feb 2015, < <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/18/tony-abbott-indonesia-reciprocate-tsunami-aid-sparing-bali-nine-pair> > [Accessed 4 May 2016].

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Kai He, *Indonesia’s Foreign Policy After Suharto*, 58.

<sup>48</sup> Iain Henry, *Australia’s ‘Historic Policy Shift’ on East Timor*, 64.

indeed many factors that took place in both of these results within this variable of ministerial influence. It has been argued that the only reason autonomy or independence was granted was because Habibie was much less of a hardliner than Suharto on the issue. It is doubtful that the letter from John Howard would have worked if it was sent under the Suharto regime. It is clear that there was Australian ministerial influence in the decision but the efforts of the Australian government only achieved their desired result because of the right conditions existing. An argument can be made for the way Australia approached Indonesia on each issue. In the case of the executions Australia approached the issue with threats and outright condemnation of the situation. While in the East Timor case Australia approached as a friend. A whole paper could be written on the factors that differentiate the way in which Indonesia was approached in each situation but this is very basic and clear. If Australia had approached Indonesia differently in the case of the executions would there have been a difference in result. Was there even an option for Australia to approach Indonesia a different way in the case of the executions? What would have happened if Australia approached Indonesia with threats in the East Timor case? Would this have resulted in a different result? All these questions would need to be answered in order to say definitively but there certainly is a correlation, based on just these two cases, that lines up the way Australia approaches Indonesia and the result it receives in return. This paper would conclude that while the ministerial variable mattered in the East Timor case it was not influential in the case of the executions. Instead this section would need to fit into a larger examination of the variables in the East Timor case to be conclusive as to why it worked in one situation but not the other.

#### **Australian influence in wider international system**

The executions of Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukamaran were largely a bilateral issue with a lot of the effort in influencing the Indonesian government coming from the Australian ministerial level. What can be identified is that the United Nations and Amnesty International joined the Australian government in its calls for Indonesia to not execute the two men, as well as the others that were to be executed with the two men.<sup>49</sup> Indeed, it is not the place for a lot of organisations to be involved in a bilateral exchange between Australia and Indonesia. Nor is the issue important enough for there to be a widespread international influences on the issue.

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<sup>49</sup> 'Ban Ki-moon Makes Plea to Indonesia over Executions', *The Guardian*, 13 Feb 2015, < <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/14/tony-abbott-calls-on-indonesia-not-to-execute-bali-nine-pair> > [Accessed 4 May 2016].

This is contrasted with the fact that Australia lobbied the IMF to not be that harsh on Indonesia, following US pressure on the IMF to be stricter with the Suharto regime.<sup>50</sup> While this may or may not have achieved what Australia set out to do, it did show a gesture that the Indonesian's appreciated. Henry argues that this support was instrumental in finally achieving the desired outcome for Australia. A part from this Australia did not think the tri-lateral discussions between Indonesia, Portugal and Netherlands were productive and instead argued that Indonesia should disregard that process.<sup>51</sup>

This section is far from conclusive or exhaustive in any direction. There was difficulty in finding the proper evidence that would provide discussion. Further research would need to be had in which Australian officials are interviewed on their efforts to lobby the international scene. It could be argued that because these were bilateral issues for the most part it would not make sense for Australia to attempt obtain international condemnation. There was a multi-lateral solution to East Timor in the form of an international peacekeeping force but this is post-the decision to grant independence to East Timor and as such it is not applicable. It appears as though Australia specifically tried to influence Indonesia on the East Timor issue because it believed that was the best option. As was observed in the ministerial variable, Australia came to Indonesia as a friend that wanted to help rather than condemning the Indonesian state for its actions. It may be surmised that it is counter-productive to involve the international system in attempting to influence Indonesia as it could be perceived as a greater threat to Indonesia's independent and active principle. It is clear though that these factors were not overly consequential to the overall results of the decisions.

### **Testing the hypothesis**

The hypothesis that was outlined in the research design section was that Australia alone is not able influence Indonesia's foreign policy decisions if it is contrary to a favourable outcome for Indonesia. This paper has been unable to disprove or prove this hypothesis, further research is needed to be able to comprehensively say whether or not it is a true statement to make. The analysis has also been unable to adequately address whether or not Indonesia or indeed foreign policy in general operates within the Rational Actor Model. However, there has been enough material to question this part of the thesis. The 'favourable outcome for Indonesia' implies that the state is the unit of analysis and that it would follow that for the hypothesis to be proven it would need to be proven that the state is a sufficient

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<sup>50</sup> Iain Henry, *Australia's 'Historic Policy Shift' on East Timor*, 54.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*

unit of analysis. While this is beyond the scope of this paper, nor is it the point of this paper to address that, there has been enough evidence, particularly in the ministerial variable section, to suggest that it is not appropriate to use the state as unit of analysis. This was clear in the literature reviewed which would indeed mean that there is evidence to suggest that this hypothesis is disproven. The first part of the hypothesis may be considered to have more credence than the second half of the hypothesis. It can be shown through the research that Australia has not got the influence to achieve its foreign policy aims on Indonesian policy. While there is insufficient research to show this conclusively, we have formed a better understanding of the hypothesis that can aid other research in the endeavour to properly test the hypothesis. This is all not to say that the hypothesis has not been tested, indeed it has, but that it has not been tested extensively enough to give definitive answers. What is possible is only to contribute this work so that there may be more research on the issue. Further ways to test this hypothesis include a closer look at all the variables on the decisions, not just the Australian ones. It is impossible to say Australia alone is not able to influence Indonesian decisions when there is no analysis of the other variables. Additionally, there could be further research into the conceptual models within foreign policy analysis with a proper application of each of them to the variables that would hopefully provide an answer as to which unit of analysis is best used to properly understand and test the hypothesis.

## **Conclusion**

Finding appropriate evidence for this paper was difficult given that the author was unable interview the people involved in the cases. Never-the-less the paper was able utilise existing media and literature to test the hypothesis. While the hypothesis was neither proven nor disproven, it was never the intention for this paper to do so. Instead the aim of the paper was to test the hypothesis on the variables chosen for review and to contribute to further research on the issue. If a conclusive result is to come of the hypothesis then there needs to be an exhaustive study to that effect, this was well beyond the constraints of this paper. This paper took great lengths to properly review the literature that formed the basis of Indonesia's foreign policy but given the structure of the research it was unable to properly use this literature on Indonesian foreign policy in its research. This would be necessary, as they are significant factors, to discuss in an exhaustive study. For example, Joko Widodo's visi-misi stated that protecting Indonesian sovereignty was a big issue for him. If he goes and allows Australia to influence him on the executions then he will not be following the underwriting principle of Indonesian foreign policy, independent and active. But on the other hand Habibie

allowed Australian influence in East Timor which would go contrary to the principle. These are just examples of things that can be examined when further studies are conducted.

The research question asked ‘what Australian variables influence Indonesia’s foreign policy decision making process?’ This question has not been exhaustively answered as there are space constraints on the amount of variables that can be analysed. Of the three variables analysed it is clear that the ministerial influence variable is the most influential. Public influence may inform the ministerial efforts but this is not definitive. In the cases examined public influence had little to no influence directly on Indonesia despite there being a chance that it informed the ministerial influence variable. What is even clearer is that there was little involvement in Australia trying to get international support for its goals. The United Nations did join Australia in its calls to Indonesia in trying to stop the executions but it is unclear and unlikely that Australia was the driving force behind this. Amnesty International also were opposed to the executions but this would have also been unlikely for Australia to have been behind it. In summation the most important variable was the ministerial variable by far in this study, but there is plenty of room for further analysis to be done on to what extent does the Australian public influence Australian foreign policy or the ministers. This however was outside of the scope of this paper to examine in depth.

This paper has achieved an analysis of certain variables on Indonesian decision making. While it is not conclusive in answering its research question or testing the hypothesis it is helpful to people wanting to do further research in the area.

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